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Good evening. It is indeed a pleasure to address a
group of scientists and engineers who share my enthu-
siasm for space exploration. When Bernie Bienstock,
tonight’s host from Boeing, first asked me to be a key-
note speaker tonight he suggested I tell war stories
about Pioneer Venus. Well, for a veteran like me, that’s
a tempting offer. And it’s a temptation I don’t intend to
resist. So my remarks tonight will be more of a per-
sonal Pioneer Venus memoir then a program history.
As the Hughes Program Manager for the Pioneer Ve-
nus project, I gained a perspective on what it takes to
design, build, test, launch and fly planetary missions.
Before beginning, let me extract a few lessons from my
experience in the planetary exploration program and as
program manager of the Pioneer Venus Program. I feel
it is the job of experienced veterans to convey to
younger members of the scientific and engineering
community the problems and issues that were encoun-
tered, and how we resolved them.
First, I learned the importance of a continuous, rela-
tively low cost robotic exploration program to com-
plement large scale expensive robotic and manned mis-
sions. Funding such programs is an unnatural act for
Congress, especially today with the emphasis on
manned space flight. I believe it is the responsibility of
groups like you to give substance to the idea and be
effective advocates for these types of missions.
Second, I learned the importance of mission success.
Those of you building instruments or spacecraft should
not be beguiled by “faster, better, cheaper.” Those ide-
als only come after quality, the paramount requirement.
Your efforts will be quickly forgotten if focus on
schedule, cost and innovative ideas does not result in
mission success. Keep your eyes on the goal.
A key part of any mission should be an extensive test
program. Theory and engineering will indeed produce
an impressive spacecraft, but unless it can be proven to
operate per specification in the required environment,
you may not achieve success. Testing innovation, to
simulate the representative environments, is required.
Third, I learned from Pioneer Venus how satisfying it
is to be involved in the excitement of the Planetary
Programs. I’ve been associated with many programs
over my long career, but none has been more satisfying
than my six years heading up the Pioneer Venus pro-
gram for Hughes.
My planetary exploration experience began in the early
70’s with the Outer Planets Grand Tour. At that time,
the alignment of the outer planets presented a unique
opportunity to fly a single spacecraft to Jupiter, Saturn,
Uranus, Neptune and Pluto. In fact, this opportunity
was singled out by President Nixon as a major national
objective, in much the same way President Bush has
announced the missions to the Moon, Mars and beyond
as part of his Vision for Space Exploration in February,
2004. In response to Nixon’s announcement, JPL
planned to begin a major contract procurement. At
Hughes I was asked to form a team to compete for this
contract and I succeeded in enlisting our best and
brightest. As the planning began, and the cost estimates
developed, NASA rapidly determined that the Grand
Tour was too expensive. As a result, Congress balked
and refused to fund the effort.
In an effort to salvage this exciting mission, JPL de-
cided to build the spacecraft in-house as the Mariner
Jupiter Saturn (MJS) Program. Thus my Hughes team
found itself without an objective. Ultimately the MJS
program morphed into the very successful Voyager
program that flew two spacecraft to all the outer plan-
ets except Pluto and returned extraordinary science
data and spectacular photos, testimony to JPL’s techni-
cal and budgetary creativity.
It was during this period that the idea of the Pioneer
Venus program developed. Richard Goody and Mike
McElroy of Harvard, Tom Donahue of Michigan, Don
Hunten of Arizona and other scientists sold the concept
of a series of exploration missions to Venus with com-
parative planetary atmosphere science as its center-
piece and a launch every few years. The mission was
assigned to the Ames team who had been so successful
with the Pioneer Program over many years, most re-
cently a flyby of Jupiter, beating JPL to the punch with
an amazingly inexpensive mission.
Ames had historically relied on TRW, now NGST, as
their contractor. Even though Ames wanted to continue
with TRW, since they had an excellent track record,
NASA insisted on a competition for the Pioneer Venus
program. We had a good team already assembled and
the competition for the contract was fierce, but in the
end Hughes was awarded the contract. Ironically the
343
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20070014676 2019-08-29T18:39:07+00:00Z
major difference between Hughes and TRW was our
superior approach to science integration. Since we be-
lieved it was our weak point we worked extra hard on
the science objectives and overachieved!
The Pioneer Venus program we won was really two
missions; an Orbiter to orbit Venus for one Venusian
Day (about 9 earth months) and a Multiprobe Bus. The
later spacecraft consisted of a probe carrier that, in
turn, transported one Large probe and three Small
Probes to Venus and released them on a ballistic tra-
jectory for descent through the Venusian atmosphere.
As an additional incentive to sell the program to Con-
gress, NASA defined the Pioneer Venus program as a
“management experiment” designed to develop and
test ways to reduce the cost of planetary programs by
streamlining programmatics. If this sounds familiar,
think “faster, better cheaper.”
All the appropriate executives, including the heads of
NASA, Ames and Hughes, agreed with this noble ob-
jective for the Pioneer Venus Program, with one very
important exception, Ames Pioneer Program Manger
Charlie Hall. Charlie and his team had been very suc-
cessful over the years by paying scrupulous attention to
detail. He was committed to making sure the Pioneer
Venus program was a technical success, and he was not
about to allow Hughes or any other hardware-provider
to cut corners in order to save money. Thus Charlie’s
philosophy was in direct conflict with the manage-
ment’s experiment objective.
We began the Pioneer Venus contract in late 1974 with
a planned launch of the Orbiter in May 1978 and the
Multiprobe in August 1978. Because we had four
years, we thought there was plenty of time. As it turned
out, we barely made the launch dates.
The Orbiter was relatively straightforward, compared
to the Multiprobe Bus and Probes that had to survive
descent through the harsh Venusian atmosphere. To
help overcome our many Multiprobe problems we
formed a strong global team. The GE reentry team in
Philadelphia, experienced in designing vehicles to enter
the earth’s atmosphere, was assigned the responsibility
for the Probe entry system, including protective heat
shielding and parachute design to extract the science-
laden Large Probe pressure vessel and control its de-
scent through the Venusian clouds. Since the Probes
had to remain stable as they descended through the
Venus atmosphere, we used the aerodynamic expertise
at the Hughes Missile Division, NASA’s Ames Re-
search Center and the Langley Research Center. Since
the pressure at the surface of Venus was equivalent to
an ocean depth of 3300 feet, we went to the Navy’s
David Taylor Research Center for their deepsea exper-
tise. To test the pressure vessel at the high pressure and
temperatures anticipated at Venus we went to the only
facility capable of simulating the Venus surface envi-
ronment, the Southwest Research Institute in San An-
tonio, Texas. We had dozens of subcontractors all over
the world.
As we developed our design, we began an extensive
program to validate the ability of our Probe hardware
to withstand the Venus environment. During this test-
ing, we encountered numerous problems, mostly asso-
ciated with adapting earth-based hardware to operate in
the anticipated Venus environment. For example, the
Large Probe pressure vessel imploded with a very loud
bang the first time we tested its ability to withstand the
high pressure and temperature on the Venusian surface.
We had to go back and redesign, increasing the pres-
sure vessel wall thickness. In addition, during the first
tests of the parachute system, our parachute system
ripped apart and had to be redesigned. Finally, at the
aptly named test range in Truth or Consequences, New
Mexico, we successfully demonstrated the parachute
design by dropping it from a helium filled balloon at
100,000 feet.
The first time we tested the Small Probe’s ability to
withstand the hot temperature of Venus we found the
interior overheated. Although the Large Probe thermal
control was successful with an internal nitrogen atmos-
phere, this technique did not allow the Small Probe
thermal design to close. After much experimentation,
we determined that nitrogen gas was too conductive for
the Small Probe and needed to be replaced with xenon,
a much heavier inert gas.
Design of the probe penetrations and windows was an
equally challenging problem, especially for the Large
Probe Infrared Radiometer. The only material that
would meet the requirements of this instrument at the
high temperatures and pressures was natural diamond.
We went to the South African diamond company, De-
Beers, to find a diamond large enough for our needs.
They came up with a 200 carat diamond which was
then polished to a _ inch window. The company that
processed the diamond was so excited about being part
of planetary exploration that they issued an impressive
brochure explaining how the window was produced.
As difficult and expensive as that process was, it was
even more challenging and expensive to determine out
how to attach this window to the titanium pressure ves-
sel. We finally developed a brazing process that pro-
vided a leak-proof seal.
Resolving these problems, and many more like them,
put us behind schedule. By the end of the program, our
teams were working 24/7 in order to accomplish the
final assembly, integration and test of our multiple
spacecraft. The outcome was a real cliffhanger but at
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the end, with an all-out effort, we launched the Orbiter
in May 1978 and the Multiprobe in August 1978, ex-
actly on the original schedule set 6 years earlier
Even after launch there were problems. Our onboard
computer on both the Orbiter and Multiprobe Bus ex-
perienced single event upsets from high-energy parti-
cles. We redesigned the firing sequence of the Orbiter
solid motor many times, to find the optimal program-
ming sequence. It was fired by an autonomous on-
board timer, with no direct control from the ground
stations. If the firing occurred too early, the Orbiter
would miss Venus altogether. Too late, and the Orbiter
would enter the Venusian atmosphere. In addition, the
Orbiter developed a small nutation which could have
affected the solid rocket motor firing. Thus we needed
to spin-up the Orbiter to make it more stable. In the
end, we resolved these last problems and on December
4, 1978 the Orbiter solid rocket motor fired and in-
jected the spacecraft into Venus orbit – exactly as
planned.
And five days later, on December 9th, five spacecraft,
including the Multiprobe Bus, the Large Probe and 3
Small Probes, approached Venus. They had separated 3
weeks earlier to target 5 different landing sites on Ve-
nus. In order to conserve battery power, the one Large
and three Small Probes that communicated directly
with Earth did not begin transmitting until approxi-
mately 20 minutes prior to entry, presumably enough
time for the DSN to acquire the transmissions from all
probes. Since the probes had been dormant for 4
months, we had no idea of their health status or for that
matter whether they were still working. Furthermore,
with the need to acquire four probes in a few minutes,
there was limited room for DSN error. Needless to say,
we were a very anxious group in mission control. The
specter of 6 years’ work going down the drain was
quite real. As you can imagine, there were loud cheers
in mission control and around the world as cheerful
Aussie operators at the DSN station in Tidbinbilla an-
nounced “probe acquired” shortly after the onboard
timer turned the probes on. The probes transmitted
scientific and engineering data for the one-hour descent
to the surface. Even though there was no plan to sur-
vive landing, one Small Probe continued to transmit
data from the surface for over another hour before be-
ing consumed by the heat at the surface.
In the post-mission press conference, I was honest in
saying I was delighted that everything worked the first
time we tried it at Venus, since almost nothing worked
the first time we tested it on Earth. Both the Orbiter
and Probe missions were very successful. Most of the
desired Probe data was returned and the Orbiter, re-
quired to operate for one Venus day (9 months), con-
tinued to operate for over 10 years.
The management experiment was a limited success.
Charlie Hall was correct in his vision that mission as-
surance was more important than squeezing the last
dollar out of costs. Nevertheless, with our efforts to
complete the program efficiently, the total spacecraft
cost for the two missions was approximately $100M
for 6 spacecraft or about $300M in today’s dollars.
NASA got good value. After much personal conflict
with Charlie over how the program was to be executed,
we eventually became good friends with the common
objective of a successful outcome. Our final award fee
was close to 100%.
Subsequently the Planetary Program fell on bad times,
partially due to NASA’s focus on the Space Shuttle and
International Space Station. Planetary launches de-
clined to once per decade instead of one every few
years, with programs like Galileo or Magellan absorb-
ing most of the limited funds. The original plan, to
continue visiting Venus with Probes, was abandoned.
In fact, the next probe to enter a planetary atmosphere
was the Galileo probe, 17 years later.
My company, Hughes, reduced its efforts on planetary
exploration and redirected the focus on communication
satellites, becoming the world leader in this field. Sev-
eral members of the Pioneer Venus team went on to
develop the satellite direct-to- home service, DirecTV,
which became a huge financial success for Hughes.
I’m pleased to note that there is now a renaissance in
the Planetary Programs. Under Dan Goldin’s leader-
ship, the Discovery Program has resurrected lower
cost, smaller programs like the Mars lander, Sojourner,
which was enormously successful and captured the
public’s imagination. Today, there are two robots ex-
ploring the surface of Mars, the Genesis spacecraft is
on its way to Earth, the Casini spacecraft is now orbit-
ing Saturn and the Huygens Probe is due to enter the
Titan atmospheric early next year. Maybe it’s even
time to return to Venus!
Thank you for inviting me to speak. Good luck to all of
you. You are in an interesting field at an interesting
time.
My thanks to Bernie Bienstock for inviting me to the
Probe Conference and helping me prepare this paper.
Finally, preparing this paper reminded me how much
of a privilege it was to work with an outstanding team
at Hughes, Ames, JPL, our subcontractors and the sci-
entific community. I salute them all. They made Pio-
neer Venus a success.
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